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PETITION FOR REHEARING 
COMES NOW the Appellants, by Attorney Aron Stanton, and Peti-
tions the Court, in good faith and not for delay, for a re-hearing 
in this entitled matter. 
The Court, in rendering its decision, handed down an opinion 
that is narrow, limited, prejudicial to justice and does not 
fairly address the issues and arguments raised in the Brief and 
the letter submitted to the Court addressing pertinent and sig-
nificant authority, as allowed, pursuant to Rule 24(j), Rules of 
the Supreme Court, 
Further, it is apparent, by the reading of the Court's 
opinion, the Court did not make itself knowledgeable of the facts, 
pleadings and papers on file, nor consider the issues raised and 
the arguments of the Appellants, The Court was quick to uphold 
the governmental immunity of the Dram Shop Act without exercising 
its powers of fashioning consistent and rational limits to govern-
mental immunity based upon the issues, arguments and authorities 
presented. 
The following points of law or fact which the Court overlooked 
or failed to address are stated with particularity as follows: 
!• The Court's opinion states the Appellants did not chal-
lenge the constitutionality of the Dram Shop Act, The Appellants 
challenged the constitutionality of the Dram Shop Act, Rule 24 (j) , 
Rules of the Utah Supreme Court allow pertinent and significant 
authority that comes to the attention of a party after that 
party's Brief has been filed, or after oral argument, but before 
-1-
a decision by properly advising the Clerk of the Court by letter 
of an original and five copies. (Emphasis added) 
On April 16, 1989, Attorney for Appellants, submitted to the 
Clerk of the Court, in compliance with Rule 24(j), a letter 
pointing out the pertinent and significant authorities that, by 
their own wording, challenges the constitutionality of the Dram 
Shop Act and raises the following issues: (A copy of the letter 
is attached and incorporated herein by reference.) 
NOTE: Rule 24 (j) only allows the pointing out of the per-
tinent and significant authorities. Does not allow for argument. 
Therefore, it appears if falls to the Court to apply those perti-
nent and significant authorities to the case under appeal. In 
this case, it is pretty straight forward and the issues raised 
are obvious. 
A. Whether the governmental immunity, claimed by Allen 
Forsyth, granted under the Utah Dram Shop Act, codified at U.C.A. 
32-31-2 being contrary to the provisions of Article XVI, §5 
[Injury Resulting in Death-Damages]; Article I, §26 [Provisions 
Mandatory and Prohibitory]; and Article I, §24 [Uniform Operation 
of Law] Utah Constitution is constitutional in this case of iniury 
causing Jacquelyn Brinkerhoff's death? 
B. Whether governmental immunity, claimed by Allen Forsyth, 
granted under the Utah Dram Shop Act codified at U.C.A. 32-11-2 
being contrary to the provisions of Article XVI, §5 [Injuries 
Resulting in Death-Damages]; Article I, §26 [Provisions Mandatory 
and Prohibitory]; and Article I, §24 [Uniform Operation of Law] 
Utah Constitution is constitutional in this case of injury causing 
Jacquelyn Brinkerhoff1s death when the State of Utah self-insures 
-2-
and carries liability insurance? 
C. Whether the limit of Judgement against a governmental 
entity or employee codified at U.C.A. 63-30-34 (i) being contrary 
to the provisions of Article XVIyi §5 [Injuries Resulting in Death-
Damages] Utah Constitution is constitutional in this case of injury 
causing Jacquelyn Brinkerhofffs death? 
D. Whether the governmental immunity, claimed by Allen 
Forsyth, granted to National Guard Employees codified at U.C.A. 
63-30-10 (1) (i) for injuries arising* out of the activities of the 
Utah National Guard being contrary to the provisions of Article 
XVI, §5 [Injuries Resulting in Death-Damages; Article I, §26 
Provisions Mandatory and Prohibitory]; and Article I, §24 [Uniform 
Operation of Law] is constitutional in this case of injury 
causing Jacquelyn Brinkerhoffs death? 
E. The Appellants provided the Court with an informal 
opinion, numbered 85-92, dated January 8, 1986, (two years after 
the death of Jacquelyn Brinkerhoff), expressing the Attorney 
General's position on the Dram Shop Act and governmental immunity. 
The opinion is contrary to the position the State argued to the 
Court in this case. It is the opinion of the Attorney General 
the NCO Club and its employees can be held liable under Utah's 
Dram Shop Act. An adjunct issue is whether the State has dealt 
fairly with the Appellants? 
Further, it is the Attorney General's opinion the NCO Club 
and its employees do not meet the test laid down in Standiford v. 
Salt Lake City Corporation, 609 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1980). Hence, it 
is not a governmental function as required in U.C.A. 63-30-3 and 
-3-
Thu^ Is not entitled to immunity status. A copy of the informal 
opinion is attached and incorporated herein by reference. 
NOTE: The State of Utah was not sued, but, undertook the 
defense of Allen Forsyth, a National Guard employee, as required 
as a self-insurer and holder of liability insurance. Later, when 
the State maximum dollar amount had been paid out, the case was 
turned over to the law firm of Kipp & Christian, who represents 
the commercial carrier of liability insurance on the State of Utah 
that kicks in when the State has paid out its maximum dollar 
amount of self-insurance. 
2. The Court did not address the test for governmental 
immunity and its applicability to the Camp Williams NCO Club 
and Allen Forsyth as laid down in Standiford v. Salt Lake City 
Corporation, 605 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1980), to wit: 
Tests for determining governmental 
immunity is whether activity under 
consideration is of such unique nature 
that it can only be performed by 
governmental agency or that it ,is 
essential to the care of governmental 
activity. 
Turning now to the fact of the Court overlooking or failing 
to address points of law and facts and their application to U.C.A. 
63-30-3, as amended by the 1978 legislature. 
It has been stated in scholarly analysis that the legislature 
designed the statutory scheme to allow the Court flexibility and 
adaptability in fashioning consistent and rational limits to 
governmental immunity. To that end, the legislature intended the 
Courts to have the powers to restrict the scopes of governmental 
immunity. 
-4-
Article XVI, §5, Utah Constitution grants the Appellants the 
right of action to recover damages for injuries resulting in death. 
That right is never to be abrogated. The Dram Shop Act abrogates 
that right. 
Article If §26, Utah Constitution makes the provisions man-
datory upon the law. Therefore, a right of action by the Appellants, 
to recover damages for injuries resulting in death, cannot be waived 
by the governmental immunity of the Dram Shop Act. 
U.C.A. 63-30-28 etc. authorizes public entities to secure 
liability insurance covering the entity and its employees. This 
authorization is relevant whether a governmental immunity should 
be subjected to tort claims by the Appellants. Most jurisdictions 
waive immunity up to the face amount of the policy. 
The test laid down in Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corporation 
did away with governmental functions and proprietory functions and 
looks to the activity to determine if it is essential to the core 
of governmental activity. Can Allen Forsyth, as a part time bar-
tender for the Camp Williams NCO Club, hide behind the governmental 
immunity of the Dram Shop Act or immunity provided to National 
Guard employees under U.C.A. 63-30-10 (1) (i)? 
The Court's narrow and limited opinion which clearly does not 
address the issues and arguments raised in Appellants1 Brief and 
letter to the Clerk of the Court pointing out pertinent and sig-
nificant authorities as allowed by Rule 24 (j) Rules of the Supreme 
Court has caused an injustice to the Appellants. 
It is appropriate the Court grant Appellants1 Petition for a 
rehearing and consider all the above stated points of law and fact 
-5-
so the Court can, consistent with justice, fashion rational limits 
to governmental immunity under the Dram Shop Act; U.C.A. 63-30-3 
and U.C.A. 63-30-10, 
Respectfully submitted. 
DATED this ^fLday of January, 1990. 
ARON STANTON, P.C. 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
Ma: tiled, postage prepaid, this 2^Mday of J^ L£UJ(JA^LLJ, 1990, 
four true and correct copies of the foregoing (Pet/tion for Rehearing 
of the Appellants, to the following: 
Robert H. Rees 
KIPP & CHRISTIAN 
City Centre I, #330 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Aron Sianion P.O. 
Attorney A t LAW 
A p r i l 26 , 1989. 
Utah Supreme Court 
Mr. Geoffry J. Butler 
Clerk of the Court 
332 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Re: Brinkerhoff, et alf v. Christensen, et al 
Case No. 870364 
Dear Mr. Butler: 
Pursuant to Rule 24 (j) Citation of Supplemental Authorities, 
of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, I advise you of pertinent 
and significant authority that has come to my attention since the 
filing of Appellant's Brief. 
These authorities refer to Appellant's Brief as follows: 
1# Page four (4), last paragraph from bottom of page. 
2. Page six (6), beginning with second line from the bottom 
of the page. 
3. Page eight (8) Argument III. 
The siginficant and pertinent authorities are: 
1* Article I, §24 [Uniform Operators of Law]. 
2. Article I, §26 [Provisions Mandatory and Prohibitory]. 
3. Article XVI, §5 [Injuries Resulting in Death-Damages]. 
4* Informal Opinion No. 85-92, Dated January 8, 1986 expres-
sing the Attorney General's position on the Dram Shop Act and 
governmental immunity. (Copy attached.) 
Very truly yours, 
C\/W - / ^— 
Aron S t a n t o n , P . C . 
A t t o r n e v a t Law 
A S / v h 
Enc. 
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID L WILKINSON 
ATTO»NCV OCNCRAL 
WILLI Ol T E \ ^ « « C i r i r 
DONALD S CGLEM\N Cnier 
STEPHEN G SCHVESDIMW CMiir 
EARL F DORIls Cnirr 
Go/§*••»•":• * " • *i Z **» on 
PAIL M * \ R M R Cnicr 
January 8# 1986 
John L. Matthews 
Hajor General 
The Adjutant General 
jtah National .Guard 
P.O. Box 800 
Salt Lake C i ty , Utah 84108-0900 
Re: Informal Opinion No. 85-92 
Operation of the Utah Air National Guard, Non-
Commissioned Off icers Club, in r ega rds t o ANG 
Regulat ion 215-2 
>ear Adjutant Genera l ; 
Recently you requested an opinion from our of f ice which 
In essence asked the following bas ic q u e s t i o n s ; 
1 . If the ANG NCO club meets t h e requi rements of T i t l e 
12A of the Utah Code for opera t ion as a p r i v a t e l i q u o r c lub , does 
;he Adjutant Genera l , Utah National Guard and/or the s t a t e of 
Jtan incur any l i a b i l i t y for negl igent o p e r a t i o n of the a c t i v i t y , 
Including s u i t under U.C.A. 3 2 V 1 4 - 1 , the s o - c a l l e d Dramshop law? 
2 . I f t he answer t o the foregoing i s in the 
i f f i r m a t i v e , vfrat would be th$ e f fec t of the immunity for 
nat ional Guard a c t i v i t i e s from s u i t granted by U.C.A. 
i 3 - 3 0 - 1 0 ( i U 
3 . Dp t h e provisions of AJIG Regula t ion 215-2 r e l a t i n g 
;o l i c e n s i n g p r o v i s i o n s and compliance wi th S t a t e law a f f e c t the 
,913 op in ions of Paul Cotro-Manes, Leland Ford and Earl Do*ius? 
If5--?J 
TINKER 
ICK&EN 
B MATH*50\ 
v\ 
John L*. .atthews Informal Opinion.Mo. 85-:92 
Major General 
The Adjutant General 
January 8, 1986 
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The answers to these questions are, respectively; 
1. No. See discussion* 
2. See discussion below. 
3* Yes. See discussion. 
In preparing this response to your opinion request^  I 
have reviewed a number of documents which include: Brigadier 
General Paul N, Cotro-Manes' June 1983 opinion. Assistant 
Attorney General Leland Ford's June 1983 opinion, Assistant 
Attorney General Earl Dorius1 September 1983 opinion, ANG 
Regulation 215-2, LTC Vernon^ Memorandum to Rod* Taylor dated 29 
October 1S85, responses .from the NCO Club dated 4 November 1985 
and 15 November 1985, a letter from Major General USAP, John B. 
Conaway to Adjutant Generals of all states dated 29 November 
1984, a letter from Major Larr* V. Lunt, Utah ANG to Brig. 
General Ronald E. Chytraus, and a letter from LTC Craig S. Cook 
JA, Utah ANG Judge Advocate dated 3 December 1985. Additionally, 
I have independently researched and reviewed the applicable law. 
Prior to addressing specific questions presented, it is 
of interest to note that for a period of twenty-iive years the 
NCO Club has operated without a State liquor license. In the 
past few years as a result of a law suit and enactment of 
Regulation 215-2, the ANG NCO Club has come under increasing 
scrutiny. In response, opinions have been requested and given 
regarding operation of the UT-ANG NCO Club in consideration of 
Utah licensing laws and ANGR 215-2. 
Former opinions base their conclusions on the grounds 
of concurrent jurisdiction, legitimate function of the armed 
services, and the supremacy clause. They surmise there is 
concurrent jurisdiction, that Utah through its lease has ceded 
concurrent jurisdiction to the United States, per U.C.A. 63-8-1, 
and that Congress expressly authorized the sale and consumption 
of liquor on premises primarily used by the armed forces as part 
of disciplining the militia. Pursuant to AR 210-65, former 
opinions found state laws and regulations subservient to federal 
laws and regulations.' 
In finding the sale and consumption of liquor on the 
ANG Base to be a federal activity, they cite the case of 
HcCullQUCh V> Maryland. (1819) 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 4 L.Ed 579, 
which enunciated the doctrine of federal supremacy/federal 
immunity from state control or regulation with respect to federal 
John L. Matthews Informal Opii. >n No. 85-92 
Major General 
rhe Adjutant General 
January 8, 1986 
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lands and activities* In addition to citing MsCullQuqh* they say 
•while it is the policy of the regulation to cooperate with duly 
constituted regulatory officials of the state (ANGR 210-65, Par. 
17) still, this is a mere policy and is not an admission of any 
legal obligation to submit to state control." (id. para. l-7b.) 
Concurrent jurisdiction in fact does exist, and thus it 
is important to note as mentioned in earlier opinions that at no 
time has the United States concurred in accepting exclusive 
jurisdiction as required in 40 U.S.C. S 255 (1982). Unless, and 
until, the United States does concur, it shall be conclusively 
presumed that no such jurisdiction has been accepted." Id. S 
255. In that the United States has not indicated acceptancef 
concurrent jurisdiction remains giving both state and federal 
governments the right to enforce their laws. 
In U.C.A. 63-8-1 (1985), Utah reserves the right to 
execute its process both criminal and civil within such 
territory, while ceding jurisdiction to the United States. 
Clearly both Utah and the United States have jurisdiction. 
The question then is,.if the sale and consumption of 
Liquor on the ANG NCO base is a federal activity and if the 
jurisdictional basi6 has not changed, what effect upon the 
supremacy clause does ANGR 215-2 have? Our opinion is that 
through ANGR 215-2 the supremacy clause is waived and as of 
December 1, 1984 all ANG NCO Clubs must comply with the state 
Licensing laws wherein they are located. As emphasized in Major 
General John B* Conaway's letter dated 29 November 1984, 
paragraph 3, waivers to the provisions of ANGR 215-2 cannot be 
considered, unless specifically allowed therein. It must be 
3tated that nowhere in ANGR 215-2 is waiver mentioned regarding 
compliance with states1 licensing laws. 
It is our opinion that upon passage of ANG 215r2, 
federal supremacy and immunity were waived in regards to ANG NCO 
:iubs» Hereinafter, any ANG NCO Club serving liquor will not be 
protected under the supremacy clause from liability resulting 
*rom the sale of liquor, further, it must comply with "all 
applicable federal,.state and local laws" in their liquor and 
>eer sales operations, id, 2(d). The intent to comply with 
itate laws is further emphasized bv ANGR 215-2 1(f) which states: 
Dining social ciuo organization - a 
private, not-for-profit membership corporate 
entity • • • is nQt .entitled t<? the sovereign 
immunities <?r privileges given to NAFIS. 
John L. tyk. ,<!«*• xuformal 0pAi>i$fli»9* . 9 M ? 
Major General 
The Adjutant Generax 
January 8, 1986 
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(Nonappropriated fund instrumental i ty) , i t 
has no legal connection or a f f i l ^ t t o o jritlr 
any federal organization out$^e ,of th«tftWS 
i n s t a l l a t i o n . I t in p^blect t o anc^muflt^ 
comply with all applicable atau and,,lscal, 
lav^ of the j u r i s d i c t i o n in which the ANG 
ins ta l la t ion ia located* (Emphasis .addedt) 
On the premise that federal supremacy
 ;inaotac as ANG 
NCO Clubs has been waived by ANGR 215-2 a^d s ta te law 4 s now 
applicable we wi l l address the questions presented for our 
opinion. 
I* If the ANG NCO Club meets the requirements of 
t i t l e 32A of the Utah Code for operation as a private 
liquor club, does the Adjutant General, Utah National 
Guard and/or State of Utah incur any l i a b i l i t y for 
negligent operation of the a c t i v i t y , including s u i t 
«Ader JJ..C.A. 32A-14-1, the so-cal led Dramshop Law? 
With ANGR 215-2 resulting in the waiver of the 
supremacy clause the NCO Club must comply with the Utah liquor 
l icensing laws T i t l e 32A. If the ANG base i s under jur isd ic t ion 
of the Utah Alcohol Beverage Control Commission pursuant to 
U.C.A. 32A-5-2, and i s a non-profit corporation as required by 
ANGR 215-2 section 1 ( f ) , a s tate liquor l i cense would be 
required. Whether the ANG NCO Club could meet the requirments 
for a s tate liquor l i cense i s a separate question and i s not 
addressed in t h i s opinion. If the l i cens ing requirement has been 
met, the question then becomes, what l i a b i l i t y , if any, attaches 
to the Adjutant General, Utah National Guard and/oi State of 
Utah? 
Whether .or not U.C.A. 32A-14-1, Utahfs Dramshop Act 
impose the l i a b i l i t y upon the Adjutant General, Utah National 
Guard and/or State of Utah must be addressed by looking at the 
s tatute , which s t a t e s : 
(1) Any PfiXJiQJl who g ives , s e l l s , £ i 
otheryige provides UflUQr t 0 another contrary 
to th i s t i t l e and by those actions causes the 
intoxicat ion of the other person, i s l i a b l e 
for injur ies in person, property, or means of 
support to any third person, or the spouse, 
chi ld, or parent of that third person, 
resulting from the intoxicat ion. 
John L. Matthews Informal Opinion No. 85-92 
Major General 
The Adjutant Genera] 
January 8, 1986 
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(2) A person who suffers an injury 
under subsection (1) has a cause of action 
against the intoxicated person and the person 
who provided thft liquor.in violation gf 
au^aectifin (1)# or e i ther of them. 
(3) If a person having r ights or 
l i a b i l i t i e s under t h i s sec t ion d i e s , the 
r ights or l i a b i l i t i e s provided by t h i s 
s ec t ion survive to or against that person's 
e s t a t e . (Emphasis added.) 
T i t l e 32A contains several operational r e s t r i c t i o n s re lat ing to 
the unlawful s a l e or furnishing of l iquor including: furnishing 
liquor t o any minor, t o any in terd ic ted person or person 
ac tua l ly , apparently, or obviously drunk. U.C.A. 32A-12-8 
through 11 (Supp. 1985) . Clearly, the ANG NCO Club must comply 
with these provisions* Accordingly, i f a person while at a NCO 
Club becomes intox icated and in turn injures another, the 
Dramship Act would be appl icable . 
The Dramshop Act, however, i s l imited in i t s 
appl icat ion by the d e f i n i t i o n provided in U.C.A. 32A-l-5(22) 
which s t a t e s : 
Person means any individual , 
partnership, firm corporation, a s soc ia t ion , 
business t r u s t , or other form of business 
enterpr i se , including a receiver or t rus tee , 
and the plural as wel l as the singular 
number, unless the intent to give a more 
l imi ted meaning i s d i sc losed by the context . 
As s tated by Craig S. Cook, LTC, JA, UT-ANG in his l e t t e r dated 
December 3 , 1985, 'obviously , any bartender at the NCO Club would 
c lear ly f i t under t h i s d e f i n i t i o n . ^Conceivably, the NCO Club 
i t s e l f as a private ent i ty would a l so be l i a b l e for any 
negl igence ." I a l so agree with LTC Cook that U.C.A. 32A-14-2 
would mote than l i k e l y immunize the Adjutant General and the Utah 
National Guard and/or State of Utah from s u i t . U.C.A. 32A-14-2 
s t a t e s t 
No provis ion of t h i s t i t l V creates any 
c j v i l l i a b i l i t y on the part o£, the &La£j&, i t s 
agenc ies , employees , . the commission, the 
department, o | any s t a t e p o l i t i c a l 
subdivisions {u ^ i^n^ u^t, pf their act iv it lea 
in rftguIfttingfi^ <?Mi?Pllingf authorizing or 
John L. Matthews Informal Opfcrvlott No. 85t*»2 
Major General 
The Adjutant General 
January 8 , 1986 
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otherwise being involved in t h e s a l e or other 
d i s t r i b u t i o n of a l c o h o l i c bever*sefs:<-
(Emphasis added.) 
Any s t a t e l i a b i l i t y would be based upon i t s l i c e n s i n g the ANG NCO 
Club. This theory f a i l s in that l i c e n s i n g i s c l e a r l y a 
governmental funct ion and immunity would-attach. Any l i a b i l i t y 
on tne Adjutant General 's part would be based on h i s approval of 
the NCO l i c e n s e , which i s required by ANGR 215-2 para. 3 ( b ) . 
Both the s t a t e and Adjutant General are excluded 'from" any 
l i a b i l i t y under U.C.A. 32A-14-2. Since< ne i ther are' respons ib le 
for the c l u b ' s da i ly operat ion , they-should n o t - i n c u r l i a b i l i t y 
simply by carrying out t h e i r governmental d u t i e s . On the other 
hand, employees of the club and the club as a l eqa l e n t i t y can :be 
held l i a b l e under Utah1s«Dramshop L i a b i l i t y Act .* 
2. If the answer t o the foregoing i s in the 
a f f i rmat ive , what would be the e f f e c t of the immunity 
for National Guard a c t i v i t i e s from s u i t granted by 
U.C.A. 63-30-10(1)? 
If the Adjutant General, Utah National Guard and/or 
State of Utah could be held l i a b l e on some b a s i s , U.C.A. S 63-30-
10( i ) would be of l i t t l e he lp . I t s t a t e s : 
(1) Immunity from s u i t of a l l 
•governmental e n t i t i e s i s waived for injury 
proximately caused by a neg l igent act or 
1
 It nas come to our a t t e n t i o n that the "Cit izens Council on 
Alcohol ic ,Beverage Control", which a c t s in an advisory capacity 
to the L e g i s l a t u r e , i s present ly in the process of construct ing a 
proposed amendment .to the Dram Shop Act. The proposed amendment 
w i l l be presented in the 1986 Annual General Sess ion . Although 
present ly not ye t in f i n a l form i t w i l l encompass concepts 
enunciated in the " C i t i z e n s Council November 1985 Report to the 
Utah L e g i s l a t u r e . " In view of t h i s opinion, of i n t e r e s t i s the 
proposal to e l iminate the State of Utah's immunity from l i a b i l i t y 
as granted under U.C.A, 32A-14-2. Immunity would be e l iminated 
for the s a l e of a l c o h o l i c beverages out of a s t a t e l iquor s tore 
t o a minor, a person apparently i n t o x i c a t e d , or to a known 
i n t e r d i c t e d person, i f the proposed amendment becomes law no 
longer w i l l the s t a t e , e t , a l . . have complete immunity under 
U.C.A. 32A-14-2, and the door would be ooen for a l o a i c a l 
extens ion of l i a b i l i t y . 
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omission of an employee committed within the 
scope of employment, except if the injury: 
(i) Arises out of the a c t i v i t i e s of the 
Utah National Guard. 
On i t s face i t appears that the very a c t i v i t y which 
ould give r i s e to l i a b i l i t y would a lso give r i se to immunity, 
owever, the Governmental Immunity Act re ta ins immunity only for 
njuritrs occurring in the exerc i s e of a governmental funct ion. 
• C.A. 63-30-3* The proprietary - governmental ana lys i s was 
eanalyzed by the Utah Supreme Court in Standiford V. Salt LaKe 
i t y £orp. . 609 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1980) . The court rejected the 
roprietary-governmental a n a l y s i s and replaced i t with a more 
orkable t e s t . "The new t e s t for determining governmental 
mmunity i s whether a c t i v i t y under considerat ion i s of such 
nique nature that i t can only be performed by a governmental 
gency or that i t i s e s s e n t i a l to the core of governmental 
c t i v i t y . Clearly t h i s new standard broadens governmental 
l a b i l i t y and i s cons i s tent with the plain l e g i s l a t i v e intent in 
.C.A. 63-30-1 et s e q . , to expand governmental l i a b i l i t y . " xd-
t 1237. 
Under the new t e s t i t i s obvious that U.C.A. 
3-30-10( i ) would not include the a c t i v i t i e s of the ANG NCO Club 
n terms of the sa le or d i s t r i b u t i o n of a lcohol . These 
c t l v i t i e s are not of such a unique nature that they can only be 
erformed by a governmental agency, nor are th'ey ones e s s e n t i a l 
o the core of governmental a c t i v i t y . I t i s . t h e r e f o r e my opinion 
hat U.C.A. 63-30-10( i ) would not serve as a sh i e ld from 
l a b i l i t y t o an ANG NCO Club in the sa le or d i s t r i b u t i o n of 
1cohol• 
3 . Do the provis ions of ANGR 215-2 r e l a t i n g , t o 
l i cens ing , provis ions and compliance with s t a t e law 
af fect the 1983 opinions of Paul Cotro-Manes, Leland 
Ford and
 ;Earl Dorius? 
Ag^flispussed
 vat;.,the f ^r«tj part of t h i s opinion, upon 
nnqti^ enLtt pf,</^R/.2Mr2t,r tjie supremacy argument i s no longer 
ontrolJ,4n$>,.o earlier,, opinions were, wri t ten prior to the 
tfomulgation of ANGR 215-2• #enc'<e, t h i s opinion l i m i t s the 
a r l i e r opinions t o the extent Air Force NCO clubs are concerned. 
ow any ANG, NCO base serving l iquor must comply with the s t a t e ' s 
icensing laws in which i t i s l oca ted . Although the State of 
tah attempted to cede j u r i s d i c t i o n to the United S ta te s , in not 
ccepting, the United Stated retained concurrent rather than 
xc lus ive j u r i s d i c t i o n enabliiitj the appl ica t ion of both federal 
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and state lavs. To operate the club the ANG must now obtain all 
appropriate state licenses. 
In conclusion it is our view that past opinions are 
greatly effected in that federal supremacy no longer protects the 
NCO Club from liability due to the enactment of ANGR 215-2. 
State law must be complied with in regards to the licensing of 
private clubs serving liquor. Under the present wording of 
U.C.A. 32A-14-2, the Adjutant General, Utah National Guard and/or 
State of Utah are excluded from liability provided the NCO Club 
is properly organized as a private non-profit corporation. On 
the other hand,.the club and its employees can be held liable 
under 32A-14-1. Finally, the ANQ NCO Club does not benefit from 
U.C.A. 63-30-10(1) in that the sale or distribution of liquor 
cannot be viewed as an activity so unique in nature that it can 
only be performed by the government, nor is it essential to the 
core of governmental activity. Hence, it is not a governmental 
function as required in U.C.A. 63-30-3 and thus is not entitled 
to immunity status. 
Very truly yours, 
PAUL M. WARNER 
Assistant Attorney General 
Chief, Litigation Division 
PMW/bl 
UOTEi In conformity with t he Attorney G e n e r a l ' s i n t e r n a l 
po l icy on o p i n i o n s , t h i s ( l e t t e r ) opinion does not deal 
with i s s u e s of such broad p u b l i c import t h a t i t would 
j u s t i f y d e t a i l e d s c r u t i n y by the Attorney General 
himself or o f f i c i a l p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e manner of a 
formal op in ion . Neve r the l e s s , i t i s a u t h o r i t a t i v e for 
t he purposes of t he agency r eques t i ng i t and with 
r e s p e c t t o the s p e c i f i c q u e s t i o n s p resen ted , r e p r e s e n t s 
t h e p o s i t i o n of the Attorney General as expressed 
through i s des igna ted s t a f f member. 
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